In 1983 a patient at The Alfred Hospital, Melbourne died during general anaesthesia for emergency surgery, in the weeks following maintenance to the operating theatre gas supply. In the ensuing investigation, it was revealed that he had been given 100% nitrous oxide throughout the anaesthetic due to the inadvertent crossing of the nitrous oxide and oxygen pipelines during the repair work. In this article we review the published literature on the delivery of hypoxic and anoxic gas mixtures, and the associated morbidity and mortality. We explore the developments that took place in the delivery of anaesthetic gases, and the unforeseen dangers associated with these advances. We consider the risks to patient safety when technological advances outpaced the implementation of essential safety standards. We investigate the events that pushed the development of safer standards of anaesthetic practice and patient monitoring, which have contributed to modern day theatre practice. Finally, we consider the risks that still exist in the hospital environment, and the need for on-going vigilance.
On 5 September 1983, a 72-year-old patient was brought to the emergency theatre of The Alfred Hospital, Melbourne, Australia, following a severe lower gastrointestinal haemorrhage 1, 2 . Anaesthesia was induced with diazepam, ketamine and suxamethonium, and he was ventilated with what was thought to be 100% oxygen. His clinical condition was critical, and he became progressively hypotensive and bradycardic, refractory to inotropic support. Thirty minutes after induction of anaesthesia, he suffered a cardiac arrest. The anaesthetic consultant noted in his subsequent deposition, "his appearance was ashen and blue, despite the delivery of 100% oxygen" 1 . He remained in cardiac arrest and there was no return of spontaneous circulation.
In the weeks preceding this case, the theatre technicians had serviced the gas supply to theatres, replacing the multipoint valves on the theatre pendants. This maintenance work took place due to stripping of the gas line threads. The engineers discovered that the nitrous oxide inlet would connect with the oxygen outlet, despite the presence of a pin coding that should have guaranteed non-interchangeability. They did not re-test the pendant work they had already completed, but were satisfied that they had correctly tested the supply by isolating one gas at a time, and confirming flow through each outlet. They did not perform a gas analysis test because they did not have a functioning oxygen analyser. The interchangeability problem was communicated to the acting director of the anaesthetic department, and the head of engineering. Commonwealth Industrial Gases (CIG), who supplied the valves, were informed of the potential for cross connection on 29 August, and began their own investigation.
An arterial blood gas taken at the time of the resuscitation revealed a PaO 2 of 8mmHg and PaCO 2 of 27mmHg, prompting an investigation of the theatre pendant the following day using an oxygen analyser. A cross connection of oxygen and nitrous oxide was revealed, confirming that the patient had received 100% nitrous oxide. In the 30 multi-point changes that had taken place, this was the only incorrectly fitted valve.
Discussion
Given modern safety standards in anaesthesia that are ubiquitous in the developed world, inadvertent delivery of hypoxic or anoxic gas mixtures is now unconscionable. However, the anaesthetic literature of the latter half of the 20th century is filled with reports of such tragedies, the true incidence of which is unknown, because these cases were often unreported or unrecognised.
A review of the published literature surrounding patient exposure to hypoxic or anoxic gas mixtures reveals that many safety measures have been introduced following disasters; this has seldom been a pre-emptive process, rather a reactive one, driven by incidents. This is not a story that follows a simple timeline; it is one of interactive, dynamic changes in the way oxygen was supplied, and the dangers that lurked within these developments. Sadly, it is also not just a historical reflection, as recent events in New South Wales, Australia, reveal; even with all the modern safety standards, delivery of an incorrect gas with tragic consequences remains a possibility 3 .
Cylinders
When nitrous oxide became popular for anaesthesia in the late 1860s, there was a brief period where it was made and stored on-site, with elaborate gasometers set up in doctor's surgeries and dental practices. Manufacturers were quick to respond to requests for convenient portable gas; stored compressed nitrous oxide was supplied in iron bottles from 1868, becomingly commercially available from 1870 4, 5 . At this stage, oxygen was not commercially available, nor was it generally regarded as necessary for anaesthesia. By the mid 1880s, technological advances allowed the storage of oxygen in cylinders, and it was gradually incorporated into many anaesthetic techniques by the turn of the century 6, 7 . While cylinders allowed for convenient gas delivery, the relatively small volume of oxygen available necessitated frequent cylinder changes, exposing the potential for error.
Medical gas cylinders were labelled or painted for identification purposes. Unfortunately though, as medical gases became more popular, individual countries developed their own colour codes; in the United States (US) there was even a different colour coding between military and civilian hospitals 8 . During the Second World War, the US army sent their green cylinders to a British firm to have them re-filled with oxygen. The firm filled them with carbon dioxide, as this was the British colour-code for green cylinders. A soldier subsequently died, which led to the making of the film Green for Danger. The US military subsequently decided all cylinders used in American hospitals in Britain should be re-painted to British colours, resulting in the painting of 15,000 cylinders 8 . There followed an international agreement in 1952 to standardise colour coding of medical gases. Many colour changes were undertaken as a result, but lamentably, an international universal colour coding could not be agreed by all countries and remains a problem (Table 1) [9] [10] [11] . The hazards of making such major changes were appreciated in Britain: "The changeover period was an anxious time for cylinder suppliers, hospital pharmacists, technicians and porters and not least for anaesthetists with whom lay the final responsibility for the safety of the patient" 12 . It should also be mentioned that in the 1940s many anaesthetists could not see the colour of the cylinder anyway as it was common practice to wrap cylinders in linen bags "in the interests of asepsis" 12 . This is not a problem consigned to ancient history-as recently as 1986, a patient died following inhalation of 100% nitrous oxide in Iran; manufacturers there provided both oxygen and nitrous oxide in pale blue cylinders with the contents merely written on the bottle 13 .
While paint colours and other markings allowed for identification of medical gas cylinders, all the early medical gas cylinders were constructed in the same way, making it possible to connect cylinders to the wrong leads. Sir Robert Macintosh described two fatalities in the UK in 1949 where nitrous oxide cylinders were attached to oxygen leads, lamenting that in one of the cases, the anaesthetist relied on porters to change cylinders and nurses to clean apparatus, such that the coroner was unable to apportion blame 14 . (Figure 2 ). By the 1950s it was clear that some steps needed to be taken to address these incidents. The pin index safety system (Table 1) , developed by Woodbridge in 1952, utilises a gas-specific configuration of holes in the cylinder valve to connect non-interchangeably to pins of the cylinder yoke 16 . This system became mandatory in Australia and the United Kingdom in 1955 12, 17, 18 . It is interesting to note that this change came in at the same time as attempts were being made to agree upon a universal colour scheme for cylinders. The belief that "a non-interchangeable valve that would render it well-nigh impracticable for an anaesthetic apparatus to be rigged up in the wrong manner to give the wrong gas" 11 may have adversely affected decisions about colour changes and contributed to the failure to agree on a universal colour coding system.
While the pin index system improved safety, it also proved fallible. Early piped wall gas leads were connected to anaesthetic machines via the pin index system in the cylinder yokes. It was possible to connect these gas leads upside down, enabling the nitrous oxide connector to fit the oxygen cylinder yoke 19 (Figure 3 and 4 ). Failure of this system resulted in administration of 100% nitrous oxide in a dental surgery 20 . A missing pin led to the ability to fit a nitrous oxide cylinder to the oxygen yoke connector, and there has been a case report of a nitrous oxide cylinder whose valve had the pin index configuration for oxygen 21, 22 .
Since pin indexing was only mandatory for small cylinders, larger cylinders could be connected to the wrong pipeline. This occurred in 1961 when an air cylinder was connected to the oxygen pipeline 23 . Remarkably nothing was done to address this problem and, in 2001, Thomas and colleagues reported the danger represented by the bull nose fitting, which incorporates a universal screw thread in larger cylinders. They discovered that it was possible to connect an oxygen regulator to an air cylinder and vice versa; no harm was done on this occasion as it was quickly detected 24 . The same problem was identified in 2009 when the lack of specificity in this fitting was the cause of connection of an air cylinder to an oxygen pipeline in an ambulance 25 . Fortunately, this error was detected during a training exercise and extra safety checks were put in place as a result. In Australia, the revision of Australian Standard 2473.3 in 2007 now requires all medical gas cylinders, regardless of size, to be pin-indexed. Ensuring that the correct cylinder is in place only solves the problem if it also has the correct contents. Many incidents due to incorrect filling of cylinders have been reported, often due to direct violation of safety procedures. In 1960, a batch of oxygen cylinders fitted to four theatres in Sydney were found to contain compressed air; only due to vigilance was there no harm 26 . In a report from 1972, a patient became deeply cyanosed breathing 100% oxygen. It transpired that the oxygen cylinder had been filled with helium to avoid the cost of helium cylinders; the pin index had also not been changed and the cylinder had not been repainted 27 . As recently as 1990, an oxygen cylinder used to administer oxygen to a 21-month old was found to contain carbon dioxide 28 . The cylinder was intended for frozen sections, and 'C' had been inscribed next to 'O 2 ' on the cylinder. In 2005, an oxygen regulator was fitted to a cylinder containing 95% oxygen and 5% carbon dioxide, discovered when a headinjured patient was noted to have both a positive inspired carbon dioxide trace and a sudden rise in intracranial pressure 29 . Such incidents are difficult to prevent in areas where cylinders are used in isolation, i.e. not as part of an anaesthetic machine. It is impracticable to have oxygen analysers on every oxygen flowmeter in a hospital, let alone in the community.
Failure of oxygen flow from cylinders has also been a cause of perioperative death, with unrecognised exhaustion of oxygen, and failure of oxygen delivery from an inadequately opened cylinder both resulting in patient mortality in a 1962 report 30 . Even modern cylinders are fallible. In 2009, two British Oxygen Company cylinders with click-stop regulators were reported to only deliver oxygen when the dial was set between flow settings 31 .
Australian gas cylinders recently underwent a number of changes to comply with AS4484-2004, an update of the 1977 standard. The Australian standard uses ISO colours and now mandates pin indexing of all medical gas cylinders. It requires all medical gases to have a white body with the colour denoting the contents on the shoulder and a large 'N' marked on either side of the shoulder ( Table 1) . The switch to white body colours and pin indexing of all cylinders was supposed to be complete by 2011, with the roll out staggered over two years on a state by state basis 32 .
Central oxygen supply
The introduction of central oxygen stores was intended to secure supply and, by minimising the use of cylinders, mitigate some of the inherent problems. Unfortunately, though, it brought with it a new complexity and a new range of problems. Furthermore, given the wide distribution of gases within hospitals, mistakes had the potential for mass casualties. Indeed, during commissioning in 1976 of the Flinders Medical Centre in Adelaide, Australia, 14 defects in gas supply were identified, with five cross-connections of air and oxygen pipelines 33 .
While the defects at Flinders Medical Centre were detected before they caused any harm, a review of incidents from 1972-1993 by Petty reported 45 deaths from 28 central supply incidents in the United States, with 13 crossed pipelines, eight failures of non-interchangeable connectors, and five instances of substitution of gases other than oxygen in the supply line 10 . He reported eight deaths from six incidents in other countries over the same period. In total, there were a further 63 incidents of near misses from the same issues. In 1983, Russell stated that "at least one error is to be expected in a large new installation" 18 . In the current era, many new hospitals and day procedures are being built, and existing hospitals constantly upgraded. Even with the best of processes, Russell's comment remains relevant. Any new installation, no matter how minor, requires complete compliance with checking procedures.
Even when properly connected and checked, central gas supply can fail. An Australian 10-year anaesthetic mortality review identified failure of oxygen supply as causatory in two of 162 deaths 34 . A study of 66 cases reported to the UK Medical Defence Union between 1964 and 1973 found 29 cases of death or permanent disability resulting from problems with gas supply to or from anaesthetic machines 35 . In 17 instances of pipeline failure there were three cases of failed oxygen supply.
In a US study into problems with bulk oxygen supply, 59 institutions out of 193 reported issues, with a total of 76 incidents 36 . Loss of pressure was the highlighted in 37 reports, with damaged pipelines or pipeline debris the commonest causes. In two cases, oxygen pressure was lost due to deliberate interruption of supply for engineering work despite theatres being in operation. In several cases, systems were overwhelmed due to inadequate reservoir capacity. Pipeline failure has also resulted from thermal injury to the oxygen hose from a theatre heater, and a burst pipeline, resulting from the machine repeatedly being wheeled over it 37 . In a military hospital in Hong Kong, a decrease in oxygen pipeline pressure caused contamination of the oxygen line with air, resulting in a hypoxia when used with nitrous oxide 38 . Defective air-oxygen blending valves have also caused patient morbidity, due to air contaminating the oxygen line 39, 40 . Conversely, a defect which resulted in oxygen travelling down the air pipeline delivered a higher than intended oxygen concentration throughout a neonatal intensive care 41 .
As with cylinders, there is also the potential for filling the bulk storage with the wrong gas. There have been several reports in which the liquid oxygen reservoir was filled with nitrogen, with the diameter-index safety system, designed to prevent erroneous filling, bypassed using an adapter 36, 42, 43 .
In the Hong Kong report, following the death of one patient, a second patient survived due to disconnection from the machine and mouth-to-tracheal tube ventilation by the anaesthetist 43 . In 1987, Smith reported three deaths which occurred following filling of the central liquid oxygen store with argon 44 .
As recently as 2012, an event was described where nine operating theatres experienced a simultaneous drop of inspired oxygen concentration to 2-3% 45 . A new oxygen delivery line had been assembled in anticipation of interruption to the main supply during construction work. It was tested for leaks with nitrogen but not purged prior to use. The authors paid tribute to the anaesthetists before them, who had mandated safety alarms for inspired oxygen concentration, which averted disaster.
Crossed pipelines
The provision of oxygen via a central supply to hospitals has far greater potential risk than just the supply itself. In 1968, Ward predicted the danger of crossed pipelines, stating "as more pipelines are installed, and alterations and maintenance increase, this type of accident could become more frequent" 46 . Sadly, he was correct-crossed pipelines have accounted for the greatest number of deaths due to hypoxic gas mixtures. As pipelines were installed in hospitals, fitting them to obsolete anaesthetic machines was destined to produce errors. In order to attach to the old cylinder blocks, the pipelines were connected via flexible nylon tubing. A cross connection of oxygen and nitrous oxide in 1983 led to severe hypoxaemia in a 16-month-old 47 .
Twenty-three deaths occurred over five months in a new wing of an emergency department in Ontario, where four rooms had crossed oxygen and nitrous oxide lines 36 . In other North American reports, a patient died following inadvertent reversal of the female Schrader adapters during repair work 27 . Crossed lines caused the deaths of three patients in Michigan, following re-assembly of a column containing both lines. An identical error in Pennsylvania persisted for seven months, during which time there were up to 41 deaths due to this error 48 . In Japan, a crossed pipeline caused two deaths, the error only being discovered when a third patient refused to wear the oxygen that was administered. The anaesthetist sniffed the mask and developed symptoms of nitrous oxide inhalation 49 . Even in the 1990s, deaths were reported from cross connection 50, 51 .
Two crossed pipeline incidents in the UK provoked enquiries that gave impetus to improving theatre safety; Kent and Canterbury in 1973 where two patients died, and Westminster in 1975, where there was one death. Both instances involved inadvertent crossing of hoses between the wall outlet and the anaesthetic machine. One reviewer declared, "When the cause of progressive cyanosis is not obvious the patient should be disconnected from all apparatus. At least the oxygen in the atmosphere is immediately available and its concentration is known" 52 .
The Westminster enquiry revealed that multiple hose and spigot combinations were available. A lack of supervision of those servicing anaesthetic equipment was highlighted, though a reviewer noted that "anaesthetists would not have the skill or instruments to check the thoroughness of work done" 53 . In an editorial, Macintosh wrote, "Every young anaesthetist should be taught that if a patient becomes blue on 'oxygen', it is not oxygen. Take off the mask, let the victim have a breath or two of God's good air, and all is well" 9 .
Hazards of gas flow measurement
As anaesthesia became more sophisticated in the 20th century, it became desirable to measure the flow of gas being delivered. Early water depression flowmeters gave way to dry flowmeters like that of Coxeter and Son, developed in 1933. Designed to measure the flow of oxygen, carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, they were superseded by rotameters following the recommendation of Richard Salt in 1937 12 . In 1956, two deaths were reported due to leaking oxygen flowmeters, and a further two due to lethal doses of carbon dioxide 15 . Iatrogenic delivery of carbon dioxide from an accidentally fully opened rotameter led to a patient developing a PaCO2 of 248mmHg 54 .
In 1967, the call for oxygen to be delivered downstream in the Boyle apparatus followed the delivery of a hypoxic mixture due to a cracked cyclopropane flowmeter 55 . This modification was subsequently made but unfortunately it only partially solved the problem, meaning it was still possible to deliver hypoxic mixtures if flowmeters were damaged 56 . Calibration error has also caused mortality, with a death following delivery of 4L nitrous oxide and 200ml oxygen 27 . Equipment misuse resulting in death has also included use of the nitrous oxide bypass rather than the oxygen bypass 57 . In 1972, Mazze suggested that all anaesthetic machines should have compulsory in-line oxygen monitors, on the inspiratory side of the anaesthetic circuit. He noted however, that those available could be easily bypassed by simply switching them off or not switching them on in the first place 27 .
The struggle towards safer practice
The practice of anaesthesia in theatres in the developed world today bears little resemblance to the conditions described in this review. The ubiquitous use of gas analysers to provide breath-by-breath analysis of the mixtures delivered to patients, in addition to pulse oximetry, has revolutionised anaesthetic safety. The cases described above provided the impetus to improve standards but it has not been a smooth process.
In 1968 Ward reviewed devices available to warn of failed oxygen supply 46 . The Bosun device, Wantage alarm and the Cooke device were either battery dependent or required flow of nitrous oxide to work 58,59 . Epstein's system of pressure regulators required sufficient oxygen pressure for the other gases to flow 30 . Adler and Burn's device depended only on oxygen pressure, with a plunger allowing gas through a whistle if the pressure dropped 60 . The EGC gas failure alarm comprised a spring-loaded bell as well as an arm to rise and cover the rotameter knobs if oxygen failed 61 . Finally, in Lucas and Fisher's 'fail safe' device, the anaesthetic circuit spontaneously disassembled if the oxygen pressure dropped, exposing the patient to air 62 . However, Ward also reported the outcome of a committee appointed by the Ministry of Health in Britain in 1964 to investigate the death of a child under anaesthesia. Despite the availability of these new devices, it concluded that "the use of a suitable warning device [to indicate failed oxygen supply] should be regarded as a valuable additional precaution which was desirable but not essential" 46 .
The call for use of in-line continuous oxygen analysers began in the early 1970s. Mazze observed the shortcomings of the devices described above, stating "oxygen alarms must be sensitive to molecular oxygen rather than to pressure" 27 , while a report of the Westminster enquiry stated, "this is ground for the incorporation of some kind of gas analyser" 53 .
The need for oxygen analysers was not universally accepted. Following the Westminster enquiry, the Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland's safety subcommittee's views were published 63 . The single hose test was excluded as it was regarded as too laborious and likely to increase wear of the connections. An 'inhalation test', whereby the anaesthetist breathed 100% oxygen and would realise if they were breathing nitrous oxide, was considered "simple, reliable and requiring no special equipment" 63 . However, it was conceded that "this is the only instance in medicine in which the administrator is to be asked to routinely test equipment on himself" 63 . The final test, a whistle discriminator, depended on whistles changing pitch when blown with gases of different sonic velocity. Oxygen analysers were not considered, because "members felt that these are too complicated and expensive" 63 .
However, the current of opinion towards oxygen analysers grew in the early 1980s. Bageant concluded that "oxygen analysers of adequate reliability should ultimately be included as integral components of all devices for anaesthetic care" 41 , whilst Karman and Roth surmised that "continuous oxygen analysers should be mandatory" 39 . Thorp and Railton declared, "the most commonly used oxygen meter is the patient. This has two disadvantages. Firstly, the patient is more commonly the source of the problem than the inspired oxygen concentration. Secondly, a positive response is liable to 'wreck the machinery'. This must make the patient one of the most expensive monitors in the health service" 40 .
The recommendations of the Kent-Canterbury and Westminster enquiries included rigorous governance around installation and maintenance of medical gas supplies. The former's 24 recommendations included permanent attachment of gas hoses at the machine end. Ironically, this recommendation led to maintenance work that was the cause of a crossed nitrous oxide and oxygen pipeline, which led to a death 64 . One of the 22 recommendations of the Westminster enquiry was that connections should have an 'anti-confusion' device, achieved using non-interchangeable screw threads (NIST), developed by Drager 65 . Furthermore, it was agreed that the British Standard would incorporate white tubing for oxygen and blue tubing for nitrous oxide. In Australia, CIG developed the Sleeve Indexed System in the early 1970s 18 . The indexing is by the diameter of the sleeve and different for each medical gas, making it impossible to connect the pipeline to the wrong outlet as long as the sleeve is in place.
A 'permit to work' system was introduced in the UK in the late 1970s, requiring a medical officer or nurse in charge to sign off planned engineering work. As Tompkin noted, "If any clinician is not satisfied, he can obviously decline" 66 . In 1982, Seed reported the implementation of the permit to work system in Perth, and attested to the virtue of making each signatory explicitly responsible for components of work to which they were accountable. However, he conceded that "it cannot be an absolute safeguard where a non-planned act creates a hazard" 67 . In our case report, the director of anaesthetics was criticised in the inquest for not knowing that maintenance was scheduled prior to the patient's death.
The installation and testing of medical gas systems in Australia is currently covered by AS 2896-2011. It is a very large document but of note, the Sleeve Indexing System is now a requirement (covered by AS 2902-2005); the use of adaptors with quick connect/disconnect (Schrader) fitting no longer complies with the standard 68 . The summary of this document also notes that medical participation in commissioning is required.
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Change of practice at The Alfred Hospital
At The Alfred Hospital, this case proceeded to a coronial inquest. Multiple errors were identified in the ensuing proceedings. Commonwealth Industrial Gases were unaware of the potential for cross connection in the multi-point valves until the engineers from the hospital informed them, one week prior to the incident occurring. The engineers conducted the work during a weekend, and without supervision from the supplying company or from a medical graduate. The requirement for a medical graduate to be present was incorporated in the 1973 Australian Standards, under section 1169. At the time of servicing, none of the three oxygen analysers were functional.
It was a further three years before the hospital obtained continuous in-line oxygen analysers. This case was cited in the application for funding, with the then deputy director writing "It is deplorable that such a simple and relatively inexpensive device which adds so much to anaesthetic safety is unavailable for routine use. This is particularly so following the incident in 1983 which would make a second such event indefensible" [personal communication, Noel Cass].
Are these events consigned to history?
The literature search for hypoxic gas-related morbidity and mortality produced very few results from the 1990s onwards. We believe that this largely reflects the widespread implementation of oxygen analysers and pulse oximetry in the developed world, as well as more rigorous guidelines, standards and governance. However, incidents still occur, and there remains reluctance for these to be shared in the scientific community. In a European study from 2004-2006, the investigators found media reports of six deaths from nitrous oxide across Germany, Switzerland and Austria, none of which were reported scientifically 69 . As recently as 2016, there was one death and one case of neurological damage from a Sydney hospital due to cross connection of oxygen and nitrous oxide supplies to a hospital theatre 3 . It should be noted that this incident was not associated with an anaesthetic machine; since the many wall oxygen outlets in hospitals are not permanently connected to oxygen analysers, this remains an area of vulnerability. It is essential that we remain vigilant for the potential for error, and heed the lessons of those who have been involved in and shared their experience of such avoidable tragedies.
Summary
We have described a case of accidental administration of 100% nitrous oxide, which contributed to the death of a patient at The Alfred Hospital in 1983. Unfortunately, delivery of hypoxic gas mixtures claimed many lives in the 20th century, and usually involved human error and inattention to detail in a working environment that lacked the rigour now demanded of installation systems. The cases also reflect the speed with which gas supply systems developed, and the failure of appropriate standards of safety to keep up with new advances. These tragedies helped the specialty of anaesthesia make rapid progress towards the gas analysis and monitoring standards that we now take for granted. However, the need for vigilance remains as the potential for error causing devastating morbidity and mortality continues to exist.
